As long as the password to mount TrueCrypt partitions is also stored on the phone, there is no security. Same applies when there is a mechanism to mount those partitions just by a click on a desktop button. In these scenarios only the built-in device lock provides security. But it provides same security to ordinary, not cyphered file system as well. OK, with the exception that the later ones can be examined using hardware technique - but that's not the point.

Those users mounting TrueCrypt partitions only after interactively entering the TrueCrypt password don't need device lock on boot. What they need is a mechanism to unmount the partition after a while the user is inactive (what device lock on activity timeout would provide [edit: not exactly but in effect], would device lock be used).

Its appropriate and convenient to use the build-in device lock in conjunction with TrueCrypt if the device lock password opens everything.

On the other hand, its inappropriate to use the build-in device lock in conjunction with SMSCON because it disables SMSCON on boot.

One possibility to make TrueCrypt and SMSCON match in this issue leads to what I've said in earlier post: We need a different kind, look and feel of "device lock".

Its nothing that SMSCON should provide by itself, that's right.