Yeah I totally got confused. I thought you meant "walk" as in "walk away" from the scenario instead of flipping the switch. Not walk as in "Not Guilty" in the courts. I'm all straightened out now .
John is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have failed. On the track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to the right, and John can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately, there is one person on the right hand track. John can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley. John elects to turn the trolley onto the right hand track, killing the one person. Would you defend John on grounds of necessity? Why? If not, why not? In its general form, as stated in the Model Penal Code, the principle appears to involve the making of some sort of a calculation. "Harm to be avoided" has to be calculated and added up and then set against the "[harm] sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged." The principle itself, however, gives little guidance as to how the balance is to be struck or for that matter much guidance as to what weights to assign in the first place. John's trolley dilemma would appear to be fairly uncomplicated in this regard. It would appear to involve the weighing of the loss of five lives against the loss of just one. Is this the choice, are these the alternatives? It would appear that the loss of five lives is worse (would be worse) than the loss of only one life. But is this the best way to couch the choice? Isn't there another difference between the two alternatives, a difference that might make a difference, that is not captured by describing the alternatives as a chocie between the number of lives lost? If John chooses, for instance, the latter alternative over the former, he actually kills another human being, whereas if he does not turn the trolley he is letting five die. There may be only a small difference in this situation between killing and letting die, but generally we take it to be a difference that makes some moral difference. Does the moral difference between killing and letting die prompt you to give different weights to the alternatives John faces, to assign, for instance, a greater weight to the harm John would cause by turning the trolley onto the right hand track? Does the moral difference in this case between killing and letting die make enough of a difference to effect how, in applying the necessity principle, the balance of relative harms would be (ought to be) struck? The moral difference between killing and letting die would appear to make just this sort of a difference in the following (hypothetical) case: