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lardman is offline lardman
2008-09-06 , 18:02
Posts: 2,102 | Thanked: 1,309 times | Joined on Sep 2006
#51
Originally Posted by timsamoff View Post
Honestly, I wish there were more candidates and that people took the time to actually make some nominations (of which there were none: all of the candidates in this election are the result of self-candidature).
I must admit I'd prefer other people nominating (rather than self-nomination), or perhaps a preliminary round for everyone to vote for the top 5 people from the entire community who they think might be suitable, and those at the top of the pile could then be asked if they'd like to stand, etc.
 

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timsamoff is offline timsamoff
2008-09-06 , 18:19
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#52
Originally Posted by benny1967 View Post
To make things even more complicated, I deeply care about all of this and I'm terribly afraid to do the wrong thing...
Ok, but... The reality of all of this is the fact that the Council is an online entity that has absolutely no effect on the everyday lives of the community members (unlike, say, a president). This being said, such fear (to me) seems a little unfounded. Yes, we all love our little gadgets as if they were our children. Yes, we want good things for the tablets, the community we belong to, and our relationships with Nokia. (Aren't we lucky that we even get to worry about such things?) But to think that this Council may bring our world down in flames...?

There is plenty of information about what this Council is for, but I think the following quote has succeeded in shedding a lot of light in very few words:

Originally Posted by Jaffa View Post
Also, it's worth reiterating this is not a Maemo governing council. The council are not setting the direction of Maemo as a software product. Instead, this is a "maemo.org Community Council" - to help Nokia deal with the wide and disparate community and vice-versa.
(Thanks, Andrew.)

With that in mind, this whole thing should be fun. It should be something we look forward to every six months. It should not stress anyone out!

Tim
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allnameswereout is offline allnameswereout
2008-09-06 , 18:25
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#53
timsamoff, I'm not necessarily unhappy with the candidates (and I would not want to be a candidate either). I'm unhappy with the process in general (as one can read), and I'm unhappy I'm not allowed to vote because I feel involved.

But what I am the most unhappy about is that this structure might lead to a bigger gap between Nokia and the community because communication will go via different channels. Right now, the NIT is barely useful for my preference, so its important some things I have interest in change. Some candidates clearly have similar interests as I have, but like I said, I'm not allowed to participate. This indeed saddens me.

Originally Posted by Benson View Post
Some of these are fairly general; e.g. votes may be bought/sold applies to any internet voting system I'm aware of; there's no polling place under government (or other) control to ensure privacy; from no privacy, it follows that one may prove who one voted for; compensation may then be rationally offered in exchange for that proof.
True, although its possible such proof can be falsified. I'm not a proponent of internet voting. As far as I'm concerned it has serious issues (including this one) and therefore it shouldn't be used for anything serious. I'm appalled how often internet polls are used for in serious debates and are used (abused?) for all kind of conclusions. I'm glad my government abolished the idea of internet voting for elections (water board elections and voting for civilians living outside the country), and voting computers are also on the way out.

Another danger of internet & computer based voting is tampering with election results.

Speaking of seriousness there are 7 candidates and 5 will be elected. There is little if any advocacy like Benny asserted. There was no announced chat session with a candidate, the general public was not well aware of these planned elections, no youtube video or podcast, except for a few vague oneliners nothing concrete, and no dialog between the candidates. I find that disappointing. I feel its safe to say this election is a flop but this is not meant as insult to the candidates. I do wish next time is a better time though.

The Borda method is the "obvious" preferential voting scheme we all developed when we 13, trying to find solutions to all the problems in the world, then later found had already been discovered, and had serious non-obvious repercussions. (Or at least my sister and I did!)
There's always Wikipedia, but in brief: each voter ranks candidates 1-5 in order of preference; top candidate gets 5 votes, second gets 4 votes, and so on. Candidate with highest sum wins. It turns out that this solution is big on compromise, with choices who were nobody's top pick. It is not a Condorcet method, of course, but it helps in those cases where you actually want someone with weaker but broader support. There are variations, of course, with different weights, and methods of dealing with incomplete ballots.
Ah, seems I heard of this system before under a different name.

A voter might want to abstain adding a member to her list. For example because she doesn't know the candidate, or because she isn't able to decide her preference (lack of caring). Forcing someone to use their democratic right is not a good thing.

There is also a form of Approval where [s]instead[/s]besides Yes/Neutral the voter is able to say No IOW Yes/Neutral/No.
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brokenladder is offline brokenladder
2008-09-06 , 19:40
Posts: 11 | Thanked: 4 times | Joined on Sep 2008
#54
Originally Posted by Benson View Post
I'm actually receptive to the notion of abolishing the electoral college, because the states as entities (i.e. governments) no longer play a role in the selection of the Senators or Electors; giving the additional representation of the state to the people of that state, regardless of their number, seems useless and unfair. (The discretization effects are ugly, too; if it is to be preserved, doubling or tripling the number of electors and using proportional allocation would be much better.) But arguing that it does not give less populous states more influence (Smith), or that this influence never served a purpose (electionmethods.org, referenced earlier), rubs me the wrong way.
I have forwarded your point to Smith. Incidentally, have you seen his page on appportionment?

I agree it seems reliable, but the impossibility of experimental validation leaves me short on dogmatism, in a discussion; that's all.
The Bayessian regret figures are derived from experiments. Maybe you're wanting some experiment that can be performed on real humans. If so, that is a mistake.

That's not the sort of difference I meant; I'm thinking more of those who would argue that:
  • Certain people "count less" than others.
  • Certain political trends are intrinsically bad (/good) and to be avoided (/mandated), even though they cause no harm (/benefit) to anyone.
  • and a number of similar bases for choosing an inherently harmful result.
All voters count the same with Score Voting. They all get the same ballot. If some voters choose to vote expressively rather than strategically, that is their choice. If they derive more utility from that expression than from maximally effecting the election outcome, then an expressive vote is "better" for them than a strategic vote, as far as they are concerned. It's also better for society as a whole.

Your second statement makes no sense to me. If something is bad or good, that means that it, by definition, causes harm or benefit to someone.

Essentially, upon coming up with specifics, I'm realizing I was wrong; these do represent deviations from something that may reasonably be termed democracy -- i.e., Bayesian regret can be claimed as a uniquely democratic figure-of-merit.

(Which leaves the question of whether this "democracy" is the best principle, but there's always an axiom somewhere, and always someone who will dispute it. )
I do not claim that "democracy" is the best principle, but that utilitarian-ness is.

Close, indeed; but isn't that only valid as long as the rational voter doesn't know where the result falls, or equivalently, where he falls? (i.e., a non-pre-established or a highly dynamic political environment.)
Yes. Maybe a conservative would prefer a voting method that leaves conservatives better off, even if it leaves the whole of society worse off. But I don't know of a voting method that can favor one particular ideological perspective. Some methods can favor centrists/extremists, such as Instant Runoff Voting.

Score Voting seems to show relatively little preference for centrists or extremists.

I'm with fpp; I do learn fascinating stuff every time I get in an election discussion.
You're a fan of plurality voting? Huh?
 

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brokenladder is offline brokenladder
2008-09-06 , 19:48
Posts: 11 | Thanked: 4 times | Joined on Sep 2008
#55
Originally Posted by allnameswereout View Post
True, although its possible such proof can be falsified. I'm not a proponent of internet voting. As far as I'm concerned it has serious issues (including this one) and therefore it shouldn't be used for anything serious.
The ability to sell one's vote is a minor problem compared to things like fraud and low turnout. More obviously, it's far easier to buy a politician who represents 50,000 voters than to buy thousands of votes to buy your favorite politician into office. (And a permanent absentee voter like myself, can always sell his vote anyway - and this isn't causing and horrendous problems that I'm aware of here in California.)

Say you implement something like Rivest's ThreeBallot system, or Chaum's Punchscan system. You have virtually fraud-free elections, and high turnout. A few people who may sell their votes is hardly your major concern.
 
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Benson is offline Benson
2008-09-07 , 00:00
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#56
Originally Posted by brokenladder View Post
I have forwarded your point to Smith. Incidentally, have you seen his page on appportionment?
No, I hadn't. Interesting.

The Bayessian regret figures are derived from experiments. Maybe you're wanting some experiment that can be performed on real humans. If so, that is a mistake.
No, I'm not "wanting" them; I know that a non-verifiable model is not the same as an unverified one, but it's also not as strong as a verifiable and verified one. The models for utility (used, with various parameters, in those experiments) are the issue, not the experimental method.

All voters count the same with Score Voting. They all get the same ballot. If some voters choose to vote expressively rather than strategically, that is their choice. If they derive more utility from that expression than from maximally effecting the election outcome, then an expressive vote is "better" for them than a strategic vote, as far as they are concerned. It's also better for society as a whole.
They all count the same if they are all permitted to vote; if some were prevented, their votes would count less, having a weighting factor of 0. It's also conceivable that votes could actually be scaled prior to counting by a factor; say, proportional to the voter's net worth. That will cause a drop in Bayesian utility of the entire population, but will enhance the utility for those weighted higher.

Your second statement makes no sense to me. If something is bad or good, that means that it, by definition, causes harm or benefit to someone.
I mean that it causes no harm or benefit to those to be placed under it; plainly, the "good" or "bad" represent those by those instituting the election method. e.g. some people actually claim we're better off with the two-party system than other places with more parties. If they were setting up elections, they might use something other than Bayesian regret to account for in the benefit of avoiding party proliferation, skewing results in favor of some other system.

Perhaps more realistically, one could dislike extremists, and choose a method biased in favor of moderates, or vice versa.

I do not claim that "democracy" is the best principle, but that utilitarian-ness is.
The question is one of whose utility should be optimized. You choose all people (perhaps, more precisely, all people over 18, or whatever; close enough, though), with equal weights. One could choose to optimize for some subset, although utilitarian does eliminate the second class described above.

The only grounds for which I might be open to sacrificing utility would be long-term stability, but there's no obvious way to make such a sacrifice. So I'm a utilitarian in practice, and something close to a "democrat" (not a Democrat).

Yes. Maybe a conservative would prefer a voting method that leaves conservatives better off, even if it leaves the whole of society worse off. But I don't know of a voting method that can favor one particular ideological perspective. Some methods can favor centrists/extremists, such as Instant Runoff Voting.
Given the existence of a two-party system, any voting system that favors a two-party system will usually favor someone in the mainstream of either party over extremists or moderates.

You're a fan of plurality voting? Huh?
No, and I don't think fpp was indicating he was; I read that to indicate he was a fan of educational discussions on voting methods:
Originally Posted by fpp View Post
I, like others, had not "thought in advance" about how the voting would actually work, and made do with the offered option (just like In real Life :-).

However, I'm actually glad it didn't turn out perfect at first try, because of this very interesting discussion it generated, in which I learned a lot... I love this "Bayesian regret" concept :-)
I just don't see "plurality fan" in there.
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brokenladder is offline brokenladder
2008-09-08 , 08:47
Posts: 11 | Thanked: 4 times | Joined on Sep 2008
#57
Originally Posted by Benson View Post
I mean that it causes no harm or benefit to those to be placed under it; plainly, the "good" or "bad" represent those by those instituting the election method. e.g. some people actually claim we're better off with the two-party system than other places with more parties.
Well, no. You as an individual will be statistically better off with a system with less Baysesian regret (assuming simply that you are any random individual).

It is possible that there is some particular political faction that would be worse off with the particular distribution of utility stemming from Score Voting. But as there's yet no strong evidence of that, it is rational for all voters to prefer it (until such time as they can demonstrate substantive evidence that it might disadvantage them relative to where they are now).

If they were setting up elections, they might use something other than Bayesian regret to account for in the benefit of avoiding party proliferation, skewing results in favor of some other system.
There is not "something other than Bayesian regret". There are "potential things you did not factor into your Bayesian regret calculation". If voters want to prevent party proliferation, then their utility values for candidates of the major, say two, parties would go up, and they'd have a reason to dislike candidates from additional parties. That's already accounted for in the existing calculations.

Perhaps more realistically, one could dislike extremists, and choose a method biased in favor of moderates, or vice versa.
That is a valid point, though I doubt there is any method so good at electing centrists that it leaves centrists better off than Score Voting. It would take a specialized series of Bayesian regret calculations. I'm not so interested in that, however, because I already acknowledge there will potentally be a few demographics (perhaps large corporate interests) which will prefer plurality to Score Voting. My major concern is that the vast majority of rational voters will be better off with Score Voting, and that the goal of a benevolent "god" would be to maximize the sum of social utility. (Not "proven", but pretty darned close.)

The question is one of whose utility should be optimized. You choose all people (perhaps, more precisely, all people over 18, or whatever; close enough, though), with equal weights. One could choose to optimize for some subset, although utilitarian does eliminate the second class described above.
I want to maximize the utility of white male land owners.

/kidding

The only grounds for which I might be open to sacrificing utility would be long-term stability, but there's no obvious way to make such a sacrifice.
If people value stability, then there's utility in picking candidates they believe will lead to the greatest stability. Therefore the most utilitarian method is still the "best" for society. Maybe you're getting into the realm of weighing the voters' utility with the utilities of future generations. But I think it is infeasible to predict that a voting method with less utility efficiency could somehow lead to better long-term utility for the future. Since we can't really predict such a thing, I feel we've got to go with implementing the system that best satisifies the utility of the people in charge of decision making.

So I'm a utilitarian in practice, and something close to a "democrat" (not a Democrat).
I try to see political ideologies as meanses (word?), not ends. The end is utility. I generally favor a Georgist (libertarianish philosophy) approach, in which you heavily tax public goods like land, but minimally tax the fruits of labor. But the nice thing about shooting for utilitarianism is that all those ideological battles between socialists, libertarians, et al can be more objectively (and less vitriolically) waged. That's preferable (imho) to the notion of arguing to the point of furious anger based on arbitrary axioms about "my rights" or "my property". (Mentally exhausted rocovering Libertarian here.)

Given the existence of a two-party system, any voting system that favors a two-party system will usually favor someone in the mainstream of either party over extremists or moderates.
The part here about "given the existence of a two-party system" tacitly implies strategic voting (not wanting to throw away your vote). The point I am making is that e.g. IRV elects extremists if people simply vote honestly. If they instead are strategic (and I believe many of them are in real IRV elections), then the presence of a duopoly mitigates the extremism effect - I think. I cannot be sure. In any case, the linked page on IRV extremism was about expressive ("honest") voting.
 
brokenladder is offline brokenladder
2008-09-08 , 08:58
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#58
Originally Posted by Bundyo View Post
I'm following -community, and I'm not into voting theory or anything. It just seems logical that when you choose a board of 5 people, everyone will be allowed to choose his 5 preferred candidates.
That's just as illogical as thinking that an election for a board of 1 candidate entails voting for your 1 preferred candidate. Clearly if that candidate is unlikely to win, then you want to support a your favorite of the plausible winners.

Same applies in a multi-winner system. Say 1 or more of your 5 favorite candidates has no chance of winning. Then if you are given the opportunity to just list 5 candidates, you'll have an incentive to "lie" about who your 5 preferred candidates are.
 
brokenladder is offline brokenladder
2008-09-08 , 08:59
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#59
Originally Posted by Benson View Post
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/electoral.txt

The number of electors allocated to a state is not the same as the number of representatives in the House; from the U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1:
Warren Smith concedes. I thank you on his behalf.
 
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Bundyo is offline Bundyo
2008-09-08 , 10:31
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#60
Originally Posted by brokenladder View Post
That's just as illogical as thinking that an election for a board of 1 candidate entails voting for your 1 preferred candidate. Clearly if that candidate is unlikely to win, then you want to support a your favorite of the plausible winners.

Same applies in a multi-winner system. Say 1 or more of your 5 favorite candidates has no chance of winning. Then if you are given the opportunity to just list 5 candidates, you'll have an incentive to "lie" about who your 5 preferred candidates are.
If you say so, but this only has any weight if we have any information of who the plausible winner may be. However there is no statistical information on that gotten from whatever source. I can only imagine on the impressions I've got from this forum, but i guess the impressions of the other people are as many as them. So tell me who are the plausible winners and i will pick one of them i like and vote for him (of course I already voted but that's irrelevant).
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